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In his recommendation on the reverse of Konstantinos Kavoulakos’s Georg Lukács’s 
Philosophy of Praxis, Jay Bernstein refers to Lukács’s vision of transformative praxis as being 
‘too far ahead of its time’. This echoes a point made by Fredric Jameson in Valences of the 
Dialectic, in which he refers to History and Class Consciousness (1923) as a text that is ‘yet to 
be written’, which ‘lies ahead of us in historical time’ (Jameson, 2009: 222). Both of these 
comments express the notion that Georg Lukács’s essays of the early 1920s are not merely 
historical artefacts, even if that in itself would be sufficient cause to absorb our interest. They 
indicate that Lukács’s revolutionary writings, far from a ‘finished case’, are part of an ongoing 
project pertinent to the present and the future. 
With this rigorous piece of scholarship, Kavoulakos suggests just such a fresh start for 
Lukács’s ‘dialectical-practical theory of modernity’ (p.2), enabling its political-theoretical and 
philosophical resources to find renewed resonance in a different historical moment. The 
book’s aim is  
to show that a more charitable approach to Lukács’s philosophy of praxis is much more 
interesting, coherent, and fruitful than the more or less unfounded and theoretically 
unproductive prejudice that prevails in a great part of the critical intelligentsia today 
(p.9). 
One of the challenges to accomplishing such a reassessment of Lukács’s ‘early Marxist 
thought’ is the daunting number of intellectual figures and traditions that must be brought 
into focus in order to provide an adequate context for this act of interpretation. Indeed, the 
conceptual fertility of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness emerges from his ambitious 
efforts to synthesise a dizzying array of intellectual crosscurrents, from aesthetic formalism, 
neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, to sociological thought, Marxism and more. 
Kavoulakos duly acknowledges several precedents for his own work. These include 
Andrew Feenberg’s methodical clarifications of many of the misreadings and 
misunderstandings of Lukács’s work, and Michael Löwy’s account of the shifting phases of 
Lukács’s development in the early decades of the twentieth century. Kavoulakos also makes 
an impressive and detailed appraisal of a wide range of international scholarship on Lukács. 
Particularly significant for an Anglophone audience is the guide that this book provides to the 
German-language studies on Lukács and his sources, including Hartmut Rosshof’s Emil Lask 
als Lehrer von Georg Lukács (1975), and the works of Rüdiger Dannemann and Kurt 
Beiersdörfer among others. 
In his account of the origins of Lukács’s framework in History and Class Consciousness, 
Kavoulakos moves beyond the primary texts commonly referenced and analysed by scholars. 
Providing a careful reconstruction of the early stages of Lukács’s thought, Kavoulakos delivers 
instructive exegeses of various writings, from Lukács’s Evolutionary History of the Modern 
Drama (1911) and Heidelberg Philosophy of Art (1912-14), to his Theory of the Novel (1916). 
Kavoulakos also employs evidence from Lukács’s correspondence, such as his exchange of 
letters with Paul Ernst. Kavoulakos expounds Lukács’s ideas in parallel with those of the 
thinkers that influenced the development of his studies in various fields. These fields include 
the critique of culture, the sociology of literature, and, later, neo-Kantian philosophy, and 
dialectical and Marxist theory. 
One of the most innovative elements of the book’s interpretation of Lukács’s thought 
is its foregrounding of previously overlooked neo-Kantian themes and concepts established 
by Lukács’s peers and mentors. Without dismissing the influence of Hegelian dialectics on 
Lukács’s development, Kavoulakos’s mission is to redress this imbalance in the illumination 
of Lukács’s conceptual toolbox and its ongoing dialogue with the problems of modern 
philosophy. Working closely with the original German-language text, Kavoulakos is able to 
draw our attention to the continuing importance in History and Class Consciousness of 
conceptual resources derived from the field of neo-Kantian experimentation. 
Kavoulakos overcomes a number of issues of translation that have hampered prior 
interpretations of History and Class Consciousness based on the widely available English 
translation by Rodney Livingstone. While the clarity of the prose of Livingstone’s translation 
aids the reader in parsing some of the more involved argumentation in the essays, it also has 
some unforeseen consequences. Thus, Kavoulakos indicates that certain formulations have 
obscured or distorted the active dialogue between Lukács’s writings and those of other, 
particularly neo-Kantian, thinkers. 
Building on the work of Feenberg, Kavoulakos’s rendering of 
Gegenständlichkeitsformen as ‘forms of objectivity’, rather than Livingstone’s ‘objective 
forms’ or related expressions, enables Kavoulakos to reveal the term’s origin in neo-Kantian 
debates regarding the relationship between these forms and their content. While this may 
appear at first sight as an exercise in technical precision, distinguishing between ‘forms of 
objectivity’ and the ‘phenomenon of reification’ plays a crucial role in Kavoulakos’s correction 
of less careful readings of the text. By demonstrating that reification is not simply a theory of 
epistemic distortion, this distinction allows Kavoulakos to disentangle the concepts of 
objectification and reification in Lukács’s essays (p.115). This supposed elision is one of the 
recurring complaints levelled against Lukács’s theoretical framework, as we will see below. 
Kavoulakos divides the book into three sections that deal, respectively, with the 
philosophical underpinnings of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, a new reading of his 
theory of ‘rationality and modern society’, and, finally, his conception of social and political 
transformation. In the first section, Kavoulakos carefully explores the influence on Lukács of 
the philosophies of Heinrich Rickert, a renowned scholar, in his own time, from the neo-
Kantian school of southwest Germany, and Emil Lask, one of Rickert’s disciples and a friend 
of Lukács. Their writings, such as Rickert’s The Object of Knowledge (1904) and Lask’s The 
Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories (1911) and The Doctrine of Judgment 
(1912), had a significant impact on Lukács’s thought after his move to Heidelberg in 1912. 
Beginning with a conventional Kantian framework in which there is a ‘subjective 
constitution of the objects of knowledge’ (p.14), Rickert fashions a critical theory of 
knowledge. He defends neo-Kantianism against a slide into relativism by adopting a 
‘standpoint of immanence’ (p.15), and by constructing philosophy as a ‘science of values’ 
(p.18). However, the essential problem confronted by this project is the irreducibility of the 
content of knowledge to its rational forms. Kavoulakos delineates Rickert’s efforts to solve 
this problem, which lead him, perhaps unwittingly, very close to a Fichtean emphasis on 
practical reason. 
Finding his teacher’s defences against relativism and psychologism insufficient to the 
task, Lask moves away from Rickert’s subjectivist approach to the problem of knowledge, 
focusing instead on developing an ‘objective foundation of philosophy’ by stressing its logical 
grounding in general (p.18). This involves, what Kavoulakos refers to as, ‘an ontological shift 
in transcendental philosophy, to “locate” the logical in the object itself’ (p.19). Lask conceives 
of a ‘theory of two elements’, which spell out an interpenetrating primordial relation between 
form and material that is simultaneously unified and distinct (p.21). Kavoulakos points out 
that Lask’s reaction to Rickert tends to ‘downplay the constitutive role of the subject’, 
transforming it into a ‘correlate’ of objective meaning (p.23). 
In his account, Kavoulakos demonstrates the enduring influence of both of these 
thinkers on Lukács’s thought, his vacillations between them, and at the same time Lukács’s 
critical distancing from each. Kavoulakos makes the case that, even after Lukács departs from 
a neo-Kantian framework to advocate a dialectical approach to philosophical questions, his 
perspective on these questions remains inscribed with the concerns of neo-Kantianism. Thus, 
Kavoulakos contends that Lukács’s later adoption of the dialectical method is armoured 
against many of the commonplace complaints, of panlogist or emanatist tendencies that 
subsume the material content to the form, which blight more conventional Hegelian or neo-
Hegelian versions of dialectical theory. 
Indeed, according to Kavoulakos, ‘Lask’s influence was much more intense than Lukács 
was ready to admit and it would continue even after his conversion to Marxism at the end of 
1918’ (p.26). It is not possible here to do justice to the detailed exposition of the philosophical 
problems (of the irrational, the thing-in-itself), and the ‘flawed alternatives’ (of mathematics, 
ethical praxis, aesthetic education, history, etc.) examined by Kavoulakos, and which were 
analysed by the later Lukács under the rubric of the ‘antinomies’ of modern philosophy. 
Kavoulakos concludes this section by restating his case that Lukács adopts and transforms the 
neo-Kantian concept of the ‘form of objectivity’, as ‘the most general category of a 
dialectically constituted ontology of the social-historical’ (p.90). 
The second section extends the archaeology of Lukács’s thought even earlier to his 
sociological studies of culture. Kavoulakos demonstrates the influence of Georg Simmel and 
of the key themes of Lebensphilosophie (form, experience, and the tragic expression of life) 
on the initial formulation of Lukács’s criticisms of positivist methodology and the problem of 
alienation. For Kavoulakos, Simmel’s efforts to go beyond historical materialism, to locate a 
sub-level beneath the economy for explaining social phenomena, help to explain Lukács’s 
later opposition to interpretations of Marxism as a form of economic reductionism. However, 
Lukács initiates a move away from the models of Simmel, and similarly those of Henri Bergson 
and Wilhelm Dilthey, long before his turn to Marxism in 1918. 
Kavoulakos’s book describes Lukács’s refraction of his earlier discussion of social 
rationalisation, absorbed from Simmel and Max Weber, through his neo-Kantian education. 
In a fascinating section, Kavoulakos illuminates the unique combination of elements from the 
philosophies of Lask and Rickert that enable Lukács to develop a theory of ‘experienced 
reality’ in his Heidelberg aesthetics (p.107). Kavoulakos argues that Lukács’s theory here 
displays ‘structural homologies’ with his later framework of reification (p.108). In turn, Lukács 
seeks to historicise this account in his Theory of the Novel (1916). In exhibiting these sources 
of Lukács’s thought, as they are worked and reworked, Kavoulakos prepares the ground for a 
contextualised presentation of the conception of reification that Lukács develops in the 
essays of History and Class Consciousness. 
The distinctive feature of Kavoulakos’s reading of Lukács’s dialectical-historical theory 
of reification derives from the concept of the ‘form of objectivity’, to which Lukács ‘imputes 
a socio-ontological as well as an epistemological meaning’ (p.115). By distinguishing between 
the ‘modern form of objectivity’ and the phenomenon of reification to which it gives rise, 
Lukács is able to describe a ‘dual, objective-socio-ontological and subjective-mental 
phenomenon’ (p.129). Thus, Kavoulakos explains how the modern form of objectivity, which 
Lukács associates with the commodity-form, gives rise to ‘the phenomenon of beclouding the 
socio-historical character of the relation between subject and object that it organises and 
delimits’ (p.129). For the individual, this also corresponds to a ‘contemplative’ stance towards 
the world, which is a key element in Lukács’s consideration of the obstacles to the ‘possibility 
of an active intervention of the subject to change the social-historical objectivity’ (p.138). 
In the final section, Kavoulakos provides a detailed reading of Lukács’s account of 
transformative praxis and the de-reification of capitalism. For Kavoulakos, it is with this 
element of Lukács’s thought that commentators most often allow their attention to lapse, 
failing to deliver a textually evidenced analysis of his position. Kavoulakos’s explanation of the 
process of de-reification and its limits catalogues some of the most widespread misreadings 
of Lukács. The dominant interpretation asserts that Lukács explains de-reification by ‘deifying’ 
the proletariat. These readings, such as that of Jürgen Habermas, tend to see Lukács’s 
apparent endorsement of a mythical proletarian super-subject providing the theoretical 
underpinning of a ‘dogmatic, authoritarian, anti-democratic political practice’ (p.201). 
Many critics, such as Gareth Stedman Jones, also find Lukács’s employment of the 
notion of an ‘ascribed’ or ‘imputed’ class-consciousness to be deeply suspect. Kavoulakos 
warns against commentators that ‘one-sidedly stress the “chasm” between the self-
consciousness of the commodity and the developed class consciousness of the proletariat’ 
(p.187). This, Kavoulakos suggest, leads them to ignore the ‘procedural nature’ of the 
transition between these, and intermediate, states in Lukács’s thought. 
Kavoulakos gives a precise and even-handed treatment of Lukács’s account of praxis. 
Tracing Lukács’s journey from a ‘mystical ethics’ to a theory of conscious political practice, 
Kavoulakos demonstrates how Lukács’s ethical concerns metamorphose into a search for a 
‘mediation between revolutionary action and reality’ (p.158). For Kavoulakos, we can 
comprehend the apparently dramatic shift in Lukács’s position to the paradigm of class 
consciousness more readily as a coalescence of various elements in his intellectual journey 
hitherto. Kavoulakos proceeds to frame the issue of de-reifying capitalism in terms of a 
specific philosophical problem treated by Lukács: 
how we can think of a non-mechanical emergence of a radically (i.e., qualitatively) new 
form of consciousness and the corresponding social practice as an immediate 
realization of human freedom in given objective conditions (p.187). 
Kavoulakos explains the interaction in Lukács’s account of de-reification and the ‘historically 
concrete possibilities of subjectification’ (p.177). For Kavoulakos, this involves the dialectical-
procedural nexus of class-consciousness and transformative praxis. 
Kavoulakos suggests that the flipside of downplaying the procedural nature of Lukács’s 
conception of social transformation and the development of class-consciousness is the 
neglect of its ruptural aspect. Thus, there is a fundamental link between crisis and the 
emergence of subjectivity in Lukács’s work. Finding an explanation for the crisis of modern 
culture plays a key role in Lukács’s thought for a long time prior to his turn to Marxism in 
1918. It remains at the heart of History and Class Consciousness, because crisis represents the 
limit of the ‘modern form of objectivity’. As Kavoulakos argues, 
the double—methodological and socio-ontological—meaning of the concept of the 
form of objectivity points to the connection between the crisis of the dominant forms 
of knowledge and the objective economic, social and political crisis of bourgeois 
society. Both dimensions of the social crisis are due to the inadequacy of the 
fundamental form of objectivity of modern society, the deeper lack of unity and the 
conflict between rational forms and the contents of life that cannot be reduced to 
these forms without being violated. (p.125) 
The recurrent phenomenon of crisis thus reveals, what Lukács refers to as, the ‘irrationality 
of the total process’ (Lukács, 1971: 102). Locating a path away out of this catastrophe 
stimulates Lukács to formulate a transformative praxis that is novel in its dual characteristic 
of both rupture and process. 
On this point, Lukács’s thought provides a distinctive contribution in relation to 
contemporary debates on subjectivity. Thus, Kavoulakos compares Lukács’s transformative 
praxis with the ruptural conceptions of transformation elaborated by Slavoj Žižek, Alain 
Badiou, and others. Kavoulakos contends that Lukács’s ‘view on praxis as a break with 
determinism can be analogized to the contemporary concept of the “event” in theories such 
as Slavoj Zizek’s and/or Alain Badiou’s’ (p.174). At the same time, Kavoulakos argues that 
Lukács’s theory of a radical break with the given world does not lead to the same ‘paradoxical 
consequences’ as these theories. Thus, for Kavoulakos, Lukács gives 
equally great emphasis to considering transformation action as a dialectical moment 
of an open process. As such, it does not realize a mythical final “situation” of 
reconciliation. It realizes an immediate unity of the opposites that provides the 
material for a new chain of mediations, that is, for the further development of the 
dialectical process. (p.175) 
Far from an ‘irreconcilable opposition’ between rupture and process, we find in History and 
Class Consciousness an uninterrupted process of moments, which takes into account, as 
Lukács says, ‘an uninterrupted process of moments becoming independent and the 
uninterrupted abolition of this independence’ (Lukács, 2000: 56). 
There are many other features of Kavoulakos’s book that deserve to be mentioned, 
but for reasons of space can only be signalled telegraphically. Kavoulakos’s account of the 
‘constant tendency towards the restoration of reification’ is particularly insightful (p.196). His 
discussion of the question of violence and ‘popular antiviolence’ is equally apposite in our 
increasingly febrile times (p.193). Finally, Kavoulakos also presents a new approach to the 
vexed relation between society and nature in History and Class Consciousness by framing the 
question as the external limit of Lukács’s theory of de-reification (p.200). 
This close reconstruction of Lukács’s ideas in their development from his early writings 
through to the essays of History and Class Consciousness allows Kavoulakos to reveal a 
number of the well-known characterisations of Lukács’s thought to be misrepresentations of 
his actual positions. Thus, Kavoulakos places diverse readings of History and Class 
Consciousness under critical scrutiny. He surveys the immediate denunciation of the text by 
‘orthodox’ figures in Communist circles, such as László Rudas and Abram Deborin. Kavoulakos 
also relates the analyses of more widely read reviewers, such as Gareth Stedman Jones. 
Drawing on Althusser’s critique of humanist historicism, Stedman Jones finds in Lukács’s work 
an ‘irruption of the romantic anti-scientific tradition’ into Marxist thought (Stedman Jones, 
1971: 44). 
Kavoulakos notes a surprising symmetry in the arguments advanced against Lukács’s 
theory of reification, despite emerging from radically different philosophical perspectives. 
Thus, Theodor Adorno, one of the founding figures of the Frankfurt School, prefigures 
Stedman Jones’s conclusion that Lukács holds an idealist position. While deriving significant 
inspiration from Lukács’s theory of reification, Adorno detects in his thought an ‘excessive 
Hegelianism’ (p.4). Adorno’s influential interpretation shaped the reception of Lukács’s work 
by later generations of critical theorists. Thus, in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981), 
Habermas judges that Lukács grounds his theory of reification in a ‘metaphysical philosophy 
of history’ (p.7). 
Similar criticisms are embraced, in turn, by Axel Honneth. In his Reification: A New 
Look at an Old Idea (2008), Honneth revived international discussion of Lukács’s theory, but, 
Kavoulakos argues, at the cost of distorting the concept ‘by transforming it into a kind of 
constant anthropological factor’ (p.141). Kavoulakos uses his own reading of Lukács to 
advance a ‘substantial critique’ of Honneth’s reformulation of the theory of reification. From 
a Lukácsian standpoint, Honneth separates the concept of reification ‘from its dialectical 
theoretical framework’ (p.146). Honneth characterises Lukács’s theory as a form of ‘economic 
reductionism’ (p.147), and repeats the common misattribution to Lukács of a confusion 
between the concepts of objectification and reification. For Kavoulakos, Honneth’s reading 
amounts to ‘an ontologization—or in Lukács’s words—a reification of reification’ (p.149).   
Finally, Kavoulakos also questions the standard treatment of Lukács’s early Marxist 
thought as a form of voluntaristic and utopian messianism, in which Lukács ‘deifies’ the 
proletariat as a replacement for the demiurge of the Hegelian world spirit. However, these 
are not examples belonging to a compendium of heresy hunting. While demonstrating these 
arrayed criticisms as misreadings, Kavoulakos’s approach does not raise Lukács to a lofty 
pedestal. Rather, it provides a more accurate version of Lukács’s dialectical-practical theory 
of modernity relevant to the challenges faced by critical theory today. Thus, Kavoulakos’s 
exposition of the neo-Kantian sources of Lukács’s thought both deepens our understanding 
of the origins of Lukács’s formulations as well as of their actuality, their power to speak as if 
for the first time. 
As one of the major contemporary inheritors of Lukácsian thought, Fredric Jameson’s 
reading of History and Class Consciousness perhaps warrants a substantive confrontation with 
the interpretation developed here. Like Kavoulakos, Jameson seeks to displace any ascription 
to Lukács, or indeed Hegel, of a mechanical synthesis of subject and object. In Valences of the 
Dialectic, Jameson aims to restore the unpredictability of Lukács’s dialectic, and, what he calls, 
the ‘unsuspected dimensions of the problem—“interrelationship” and “process”’ (Jameson, 
2009: 205). Certainly, this revaluation of Lukács’s thought requires us to question, again like 
Kavoulakos, the easy identification of Lukács’s ‘aspiration towards totality’ with a necessary 
slide into totalitarianism (Lukács, 1971: 198). It may be that Kavoulakos’s reading is 
compatible with Jameson’s version of Lukács’s project to destabilise ‘the multiple systemic 
webs of reification’ (Jameson, 2009: 204). At the least, their readings seem to share a number 
of commonalities. 
In this regard, Jameson observes in Late Marxism that History and Class Consciousness 
is a fundamental engagement with Marx’s ‘remarks on the relationship between ideologues 
and class-fractions in The Eighteenth Brumaire’ (Jameson, 1990: 46). I wonder whether 
Kavoulakos could expand the philological evidence that he provides of Lukács’s Marxian 
inheritance, mainly citing Marx’s critique of political economy, by analysing the influence on 
Lukács of Marx’s historical works. This might aid Kavoulakos to negotiate the problematic 
nature of Lukács’s concept of ascribed consciousness, which finds its most plausible 
treatment at the level of concrete historical analysis. 
Kavoulakos’s reconstruction of Lukács’s thought seeks to show ‘another way of 
reading Lukács’s philosophy of praxis’ (p.2). While providing a catalogue of the misreadings 
of Lukács’s thought that accompany various ailing ‘critical theories’, Kavoulakos’s text aims to 
provide a means to comprehend the necessity of these misreadings within the social totality, 
and therefore a path towards a ‘concrete criticism’ (p.163). This, for Kavoulakos, is the 
hallmark of historical materialism itself, and, following Löwy, we might say, of ‘a Lukácsian 
analysis of Lukács’ (Löwy, 1979: 10). 
This reading articulates the complex dialectical balance of the diverse influences 
(sociological, neo-Kantian, Hegelian, Marxian, and beyond) that are synthesised by Lukács 
within his writings. Kavoulakos’s book is therefore a vital contribution both for those 
interested in Lukács studies and those operating with frameworks influenced by his thought. 
It forms part of a recent revival in Lukács studies that includes texts such as Richard 
Westerman’s Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism, of which there is also a review in this 
special issue. These stimulating texts are an intervention in a broader re-evaluation of critical 
theory, which is to some extent already underway. They enrich a discussion about the reasons 
why and the extent to which the many ‘critical’ theories of the past have lost their effectivity. 
Kavoulakos provides a powerful argument for revisiting ‘dialectical-practical theory’ 
as a means to overcome the weaknesses (or perhaps antinomies) of the contemporary 
theories of Habermas, Honneth, Mouffe, Rancière, Badiou and more. Further concrete 
elaborations of these critical engagements would be very welcome in future, and would 
develop this reading in the direction of the more ‘comprehensive theory of contemporary 
society’ towards which the author aspires. Kavoulakos makes a persuasive case that a serious 
re-engagement with Lukács, re-actualising the untapped resources of his early writings, is an 
essential part of addressing the question of what it means to be ‘critical’ in our present 
juncture. 
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